Representing one of the most significant global technology outages since NotPetya in 2017, the CrowdStrike incident will act as a poster child to prompt policyholders and insurers to review their policy wordings and coverage where a systemic or supply chain cyber incident has the potential to cause a massive financial impact. While coverage for non-malicious cyber events, including 'system failure' cover, is not always available or purchased by policyholders, the CrowdStrike incident highlights its importance and acts as a useful case study to review appropriate interruption periods, waiting periods and retentions for non-physical damage BI cover, if purchased. Looking forward, there is also a need for discussion as to where the line is drawn between a policyholder's software and systems, and a managed services provider. Policyholder reliance on systemically important and vulnerable systems continues to increase, challenging insurers to determine appropriate coverage limits and/or value appropriate premium.