Representing one of the most significant global technology outages since NotPetya in 2017, the CrowdStrike incident will act as a poster child to prompt policyholders and insurers to review their policy wordings and coverage where a systemic or supply chain cyber incident has the potential to cause a massive financial impact. Coverage for non-malicious cyber events, including 'system failure' cover, is not always available or purchased by policyholders, and the CrowdStrike incident highlights its need. The CrowdStrike incident acts as a useful case study to review appropriate interruption periods, 'waiting periods' and retentions for non-physical damage BI cover, if purchased. It also prompts future discussion as to where the line is drawn between a policyholder's software and systems, and a managed services provider. Policyholder reliance on systemically important and vulnerable systems is continuing to increase beyond infrastructure and the cloud, challenging insurers to determine appropriate coverage limits and value appropriate premiums.